South Korean View of P-1 Fire Control Radar Incident

[soryang]

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 12.24) Threatening aircraft South Korea- Japan radar tension: Even though no threatening action- nitpicky Japan...what's their scheme? Taehwoatoi fishing grounds - Dokto (island) disputed territory confrontation plan? Construct a pretext for war making powers?


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 12.24) Red oval, upper right, shows the position of the Taehwoatoi fishing grounds, in the Sea of Japan/East Sea between Korea and Japan. The X marks the relative position of a disabled small wooden North Korean fishing vessel in this area on December 20, about three pm. The South Korean Navy destroyer DDH 971 responded to distress calls in heavy seas, said to be 5 meters. Japanese Maritime Defense Force P-1 maritime patrol aircraft was in the area flying at low altitude. The position of Dokto (island) is represented near the tail of the P-1 graphic. The irregular polygon represents open waters between the two countries outside of their respective exclusive economic zones. Dokto is located in the open waters. Further west, Ulong island is within the South Korean exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The Oki islands of Japan are southeast of Dokto in the Japanese EEZ. The open waters between the two countries in the East Sea/Sea of Japan and current EEZ boundaries represent the agreements reached between Japan and South Korea with respect to shared fisheries and economic development. These agreements do not affect the claims of the parties to the territory of Dokto, which is in the possession of South Korea.


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 12.24) Gwanggaeto the Great destroyer DDH 971 equipped with STIR-180 artillery and missile fire control radar.

The Korean destroyer was answering a distress call from a small North Korean fishing vessel in heavy seas. They turned their fire control radar on to locate the small wooden fishing vessel, and as the Japanese aircraft entered the area, at some point the latter detected a threat warning indication from the STIR 180 fire control radar. The Korean Defense Ministry statement indicated that the fire control radar was being used to discern the exact position of the distressed vessel in very heavy seas. Japanese official statements claim the incident involved an irresponsible presentation of a threat to their P-1 aircraft. The ROK Defense Ministry denied that there was any threat to the aircraft. Channel A News analysts suggested that if relations with Japan were better, the incident would not have resulted in such a critical and elevated response from Japan.

Shin In Kyun's presentation of this incident suggests that the South Korean ship should have advised the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force of their presence and purpose in the area, and advised the P-1 of the use of the fire control radar for search purposes in the emergency situation. Shin also suggests that the P-1's continued approach to the destroyer after receiving radar threat warning indications from the STIR 180 fire control radar, is evidence that they were aware there was no threat. A picture taken from the P-1, shows the aft STIR fire control system bearing toward the P-1. The Korean position is that it was operating in the optical mode at that point to record the P-1 passing close by. Shin's analysis emphasizes that international law calls for exercising all possible measures to rescue sailors in distress. By contrast, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea prohibits the use of fire control radars "locking up" other vessels or aircraft or simulating such fire control lock ups. One South Korean Defense Ministry statement denied that the STIR 180 had "locked up" the P-1. The Koreans feel the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue justifies their actions.

The analysts felt that the Japanese response was so unusual it reflected underlying ulterior motives on the part of the Abe administration. Among those, Abe is looking for an issue to impugn South Korea's international standing and at the same time distract Japan's domestic public with a manufactured national defense issue. The bottom line purpose is to override the domestic opposition to turning the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force and it's other self defense forces into offensive military forces. Specifically, the Channel A News analysts mentioned the pending conversion of their helicopter carrier escort class, Izumo, to make it suitable for F-35b fighter aircraft operations as the specific issue currently in question. There is opposition in Japan's legislature to the new defense measures reflected in the administration's new budget.

An editorial in the South Korean Chosun Ilbo presented the view that the situation reflected the deterioration in relations with the "nationalist" policies of Abe, and Japanese growing anger with the Moon administration's treatment of the comfort women agreement, and the South Korean court recently ordering Japanese companies to compensate individual complainants for forced labor during WWII. The Chosun Ilbo editorial reported the Korean destroyer successfully rescued the North Korean fishing vessel.

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/12/24/2018122401185.html

[Kaleva]

1. The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea is not legally binding.

"The CUES document is not legally binding, but is an agreement upon which the participating nations have a standardized protocol of safety procedures, basic communications and basic maneuvering instructions to follow for naval ships and aircraft during unplanned encounters at sea."

http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/564121/navy-leaders-agree-to-code-for-unplanned-encounters-at-sea-at-14th-western-paci/

Thus the below statement from the article in the OP is not factual:

" By contrast, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea prohibits the use of fire control radars "locking up" other vessels or aircraft or simulating such fire control lock ups. "

[soryang]

2. This was a contention in Shin's presentation

I can't find any specific support for it in the CUES document. Shin had an independent presentation he put together himself on the incident. He did use the word "prohibit" specifically when discussing the "dilemna" presented by the two reference documents. However, he is not always an authoritative source, as evidenced by his departure from Channel A News as a guest, and then his recent return in this Channel A News Top Ten program. He contributed both the Channel A News Top Ten presentation from which the graphics are taken, and also did his own relatively contemporaneous presentation on the subject where he contended that fire control lock ups are "prohibited." That doesn't make it true, obviously.

This would essentially be him taking a view favorable to Japan on the issue. I have no idea what his authority is for making that contention. Earlier Shin had claimed that he was being ostracized or censored by the South Korean press for taking a "pro-Japanese" view. But he's back on the program. I found he made other contentions about the characterizations of the electronic equipment and its use that I could not verify.

My purpose is simply to get the dispute out in the open. I have no idea what actually transpired. Everything is hearsay from media sources. Judging the pros and cons of the contended issues and how the events may have transpired also involves consideration of capabilities of the equipment in both the ship and the aircraft, which is most likely classified and unavailable to the public.

I appreciate the comments from anyone such as yourself, who can shed light on a subject like this. I wonder what restrictions there are if any on the use of fire control systems on military aircraft or ships.

[Kaleva]

4. I've been out of the Navy for close to 30 years now.

I was a Fire Controlman but I really can't recall what, if any restrictions, were in place on using fire control lock ups.

[soryang]

3. What about CUES paragraph 1.5?

I'm unable to copy the text. P. 6 "Legal considerations"

Any interference with a military ship or aircraft is an infringement on sovereignty. Perhaps he was referring to this?

http://www.jag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions/CUES_2014.pdf

[Kaleva]

5. Could be.

Thanks for your OP. It's informative.

[soryang]

6. Defense News: Is 'radar feud' sign of future military confrontation...

Is ‘radar feud’ sign of future military confrontation between South Korea and Japan?
By: Jeff Jeong

Directing the fire control radar at a target can be regarded a step away from actual firing. Japan’s military and diplomatic authorities have made a strong protest with the South Korean counterparts against the radar operations, which they call “extremely dangerous,” But Seoul’s Ministry of National Defense has denied the destroyer used the target radar, saying the ship used a three-dimensional radar. The ministry later admitted the ship operated a camera attached alongside the radar to look for the North Korean boat.

https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/12/26/is-radar-feud-sign-of-future-military-confrontation-between-south-korea-and-japan/